








The Monologion Argument for the Existence and Supremacy of God

In the first two chapters of the Monologion Anselm shows, or tries to show, that “Of all the things that exist, there is one that is the best, greatest and supreme.” (Anselm of Canterbury The Major Works, p. 11. All of the subsequent Monologion quotations in this paper are taken from this book.)

The argument for the existence of something that is best, greatest, and supreme begins like this:

We all desire the good things that life has to offer – lots of various kinds of good things.

There are, of course, an uncountable number of good things, … flowers, picnics, compositions, love, etc. etc. What is it that makes all these things good?

“…are we to believe that there is some one thing through which all good things whatsoever are good? Or do different goods have their existence through different things?”[Monologion, p. 11]

Anselm thinks something like the following general principal is fairly obvious:

“..take some things that are said to be X, and relative to each other are said to be less, more, or equally X. It is through this X that they are said to be so, and this X is understood as the very same thing in the various cases and not something different in each case (whether X is considered to be in them equally or not equally).” [Monologion, pp. 11-12]

As I read this, the conditions mentioned are that  (1) A, B, …etc. are said to be X, and  (2) A is less, more, or equally X than B,…etc.. Under these conditions it is X that makes it the case that A is less, more, or equally X than B,…etc.. Furthermore, X is the very same thing in all these cases.

Thus for instance we might compare two cups of coffee in regard to sweetness. The coffee in both cups is sweet; but, perhaps, we think the coffee in cup A is less sweet than the coffee in cup B. In this case, sweetness itself is the same thing in both cases; but there is more of it in one instance than in the other, so to speak. The coffee in B is ‘sweeter’. (On the other hand, we might also say that there is more sweetener or perhaps more sugar in B than in A, and that it is this that makes the difference.)

“…since it is certain that all good things when compared with each other are either equally or not equally good, necessarily all good things are good through something, and this something is understood to be the same thing in each of various good things.” (p.12)

This is a different, and much bolder, claim than the previous one. Here we are dealing with all good things, not just those that are less, more, or exactly as good as some given good thing, say A.

[I assume that ‘not equally good,’ on the relevant interpretation, entails that one of the good things is better than the other.]

Let’s call the thing being discussed ‘G’. The conclusion is:

All good things are good through G and G is the same thing in each of the various good things.

“And who would doubt that that through which all things are good is a great good?”​[1]​ (p. 12)


Given that G is good, Anselm says, it must, unlike other good things, be good through itself (since everything that is good is made good by G). It must, so to speak, make itself good. All the other good things are made good by something other than themselves. Presumably, then, as Anselm sees it, G is the best thing there is. It’s supremely good. The things that are made good by something other than themselves cannot be better than, or as good as, G. It out ranks all others, has no equal, and, of course, no superior.

“Because, then, it is that through which every good thing is good, it is good through itself. It therefore follows that all the other good things are good through something other than what they themselves are, while this thing alone is good through itself. But nothing that is good through something other than itself is equal to or greater than that good which is good through itself. The one thing, therefore, that is good through itself is the one thing that is supremely good. For the supreme is that which so overtops the others that it has no equal and no superior.” (p. 12)

In part, Anselm seems to be thinking like this: If all sweet things get their various degrees of sweetness from sugar (i.e. sucrose) then, surely, sugar itself must be sweet.​[2]​ In fact pure sugar must be maximally sweet. Similarly, if all good things get their various degrees of goodness from G, G itself must be maximally good. 
(Clearly, in this case, G is not a property.)

I’m not sure that the principal in play here is necessarily correct. Couldn’t it have been the case that sugar (or something somewhat like it) only generates sweetness when mixed with certain other substances? (By itself, it has a nasty taste.)





In their helpful book, appropriately entitled Anselm, Sandra Visser and Thomas Williams reject the argument we are now considering. In particular they focus on this principle:

All things whatsoever that are said to be more or less or equally a certain way as compared to each other are said to be so through something that is not understood as different but rather the same in diverse things.​[3]​

They call this the Single-Source Principle. As I understand them, their objection to Anselm’s argument is that the only defense of the principle they can come up with requires that the ‘something’ be a property (namely Goodness) rather than an entity, or, say, a kind of stuff (like sugar). 
They conclude:

The Single-Source Principle will thus be plausible on many understandings of what properties are. But then G will be a property – presumably the property of goodness – and Anselm is not trying to prove the existence of a property. G is supposed to turn out to be, not a property, but God.​[4]​


This objection gives us reason to try to understand the Single-Source Principle in such a way that the G item can turn out to be something other than a property.​[5]​ 

Back to the Sameness Principle.

The picture seems to be this: different things contain different amounts of G. The more of G anything has in it the better that thing is. (Goodness is like peanut butter.)
(Badness, we assume, is the same in its metaphysical structure only in reverse, so to speak. Presumably, then, the more anything has badness in itself the worse that thing is.) 

Peter Geach has provided relevant insight into how ‘good’ and ‘bad’ work. He holds that they do not work in the way Anselm describes. [See Good and Evil by Peter Geach, Analysis, Vol. 17 (1956), 32-42].  On Geach’s view “My boss is a good one, and your violin is a good one, but are they equally good?” doesn’t make sense. 


Geach begins the exposition of his view by drawing a distinction between what he calls attributive adjectives and predicative adjectives.

I shall say that in a phrase an A B (A being an adjective and B being a noun) A is a (logically) predicative adjective if the predication is an A B splits up logically into a pair of predications is a B and is A; otherwise I shall say that A is a (logically) attributive adjective. …






… good and bad are always attributive, not predicative, adjectives. This is fairly clear about bad because bad is something like an alienans adjective; we cannot safely predicate of a bad A what we predicate of an A, any more that we can predicate of a forged banknote or a putative father what we predicate of a banknote or a father. We actually call forged money bad; and we cannot infer e.g. that because food supports life bad food supports life.  For good the point is not so clear at first sight, since good is not alienans – whatever holds true of an A as such holds true of a good A. But consider the contrast in such a pair of phrases as red car and good car. I could ascertain that a distant object is a red car because I can see it is red and a keen sighted but color-blind friend can see it is a car; there is no such possibility of ascertaining that a thing is a good car by pooling independent information that it is good and that it is a car. This sort of example shows that good like bad is essentially an attributive adjective. Even when good and bad stands by itself as a predicate, and is thus grammatically predicative, some substantive has to be understood; there is no such thing as being just good or bad, there is only being a good or bad so-and-so.


Anselm’s argument requires the Sameness Principal. G is defined via the principal. Geach’s account of goodness and badness entails a flat out rejection of it. On this account it is simply false that all good things when compared with each other are either equally good or one of them is better than the other. As Geach sees it, many ‘comparisons’ of this sort simply generate nonsense. 

To the extent that Geach’s view seems plausible we should reject The Monologion argument for the supremacy of God.















^1	  Quis autem dubitet illud ipsum, per quod cuncta sunt bona, esse magnum bonum. I take it that Anselm is talking about all good things, not everything.
^2	  The antecedent is, of course, false. There are other sources of sweetness. Pretend that there aren’t. 
^3	  Anselm, p. 62.
^4	  Ibid. p. 63
^5	  On Anselm’s view God is certainly not a property; but God is not a substance, e.g. a person, ether. “Every substance has accidents and distinguishing features… The supreme nature is, however, pure and unchangeable, and as such immune to combination and change. How then can we assert that it is a substance? Only if the term ‘substance’ is really standing in for ‘essence’ – the supreme essence being beyond, just as it is above, every substance.’ p. 42.
